The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: “As a very tentative general heuristic … major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice.” He correctly names sexism (“Men have all the power because they’re just better!”) and racism (“Europeans have all the power because they’re just better!”) as examples.
But the obvious problem is, if you buy the neo-reactionary model of how “the Cathedral” works, then social-justice progressivism is a clear-cut example of a massive just-world-fallacy in action! What’s more, I’d hardly expect Moldbug or other neo-reactionaries to take the view that “the world is inherently fair” seriously, even as hidden, low-level implication. And whether Moldbug’s worldview is right about the Cathedral is an empirical question that would seem to require serious, rational investigation, not just faith-based political commitment.
The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: “As a very tentative general heuristic … major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice.” He correctly names sexism (“Men have all the power because they’re just better!”) and racism (“Europeans have all the power because they’re just better!”) as examples.
This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of “better” these are empirical statements. Or would he (and/or you) consider statements along the lines of “I defeated him in the fight because I was stronger” an example of “just world fallacy”. What about “being rational helps me achieve my goals”?
This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of “better” these are empirical statements.
No, the “just world fallacy” is a belief that the world always reaches morally “fair” outcomes. So “better” here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense. My guess is that many people here would reject these claims and find them quite objectionable, but it’s hard to deny that some followers of the Dark Enlightenment (albeit perhaps a minority) seem to be motivated by them. The just world fallacy (in addition to other biases, such as ingroup tribalism) provides one plausible explanation of this.
No, the “just world fallacy” is a belief that the world always reaches morally “fair” outcomes. So “better” here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense.
Ok, so which moral theory are we using to make that determination?
Someone who behaves more rationally is more likely to achieve his goals. Do you consider this a “fair” or “unfair” outcome?
The clearest statement of Chu view (from the comment thread) seems to be: “As a very tentative general heuristic … major ideologies that attempt to validate some form of the just-world fallacy should be terminated with extreme prejudice.” He correctly names sexism (“Men have all the power because they’re just better!”) and racism (“Europeans have all the power because they’re just better!”) as examples.
But the obvious problem is, if you buy the neo-reactionary model of how “the Cathedral” works, then social-justice progressivism is a clear-cut example of a massive just-world-fallacy in action! What’s more, I’d hardly expect Moldbug or other neo-reactionaries to take the view that “the world is inherently fair” seriously, even as hidden, low-level implication. And whether Moldbug’s worldview is right about the Cathedral is an empirical question that would seem to require serious, rational investigation, not just faith-based political commitment.
This is not just world fallacy, in fact for specific values of “better” these are empirical statements. Or would he (and/or you) consider statements along the lines of “I defeated him in the fight because I was stronger” an example of “just world fallacy”. What about “being rational helps me achieve my goals”?
No, the “just world fallacy” is a belief that the world always reaches morally “fair” outcomes. So “better” here has to mean that they deserve such outcomes in a moral sense. My guess is that many people here would reject these claims and find them quite objectionable, but it’s hard to deny that some followers of the Dark Enlightenment (albeit perhaps a minority) seem to be motivated by them. The just world fallacy (in addition to other biases, such as ingroup tribalism) provides one plausible explanation of this.
Ok, so which moral theory are we using to make that determination?
Someone who behaves more rationally is more likely to achieve his goals. Do you consider this a “fair” or “unfair” outcome?