No, there is nothing wrong with the referents in the Gettier examples.
The problem is not that the proposition refers to Jones. Within the universe of the scenario, it in fact did not. Smith’s mental model implied that the proposition referred to Jones, but Smith’s mental model was incorrect in this important respect. Due to this, the fact that the model correctly predicted the truth of the proposition was an accident.
“No, there is nothing wrong with the referents in the Gettier examples”
I will have to revisit this assumption when I have done a bit more research into the topic. This is an interesting question that I would like to follow more.
>The problem is not that the proposition refers to Jones.
Who the proposition refers to is always uncertain in Gettier cases—this is a fundamental fact about Gettier cases. I will safely discard this assumption.
>Within the universe of the scenario, it in fact did not.
This is an error in logic. Who the statement refers to, again, is unclear in the Gettier scenario. If you would like to know more about the nature of referents and the contentions about who they refer to, do some of your own research.
+ when you use the word ‘scenario’ here—you refer to two separate states of affairs.
>Smith’s mental model implied that the proposition referred to Jones, but Smith’s mental model was incorrect in this important respect.
This is the core issue that the paper attempts to work around. There are two conflicting positions: the mental model, and the reality of the situation. How we update our mental models in accordance with the reality of the situation is what is left unexplained within Gettier cases. So, in principle: I agree, and yet I disagree.
-->Due to this, the fact that the model correctly predicted the truth of the proposition was an accident.
This is a specious conclusion. What is accidental about the inherent ‘accident’ of language being indefinite? Words are not atoms. They do not exist separately from their contexts. Neither are they indelibly linked to their contexts.
No, there is nothing wrong with the referents in the Gettier examples.
The problem is not that the proposition refers to Jones. Within the universe of the scenario, it in fact did not. Smith’s mental model implied that the proposition referred to Jones, but Smith’s mental model was incorrect in this important respect. Due to this, the fact that the model correctly predicted the truth of the proposition was an accident.
Thanks for the input though! You are welcome to read over drafts of the full paper when I get around to making it formal.
This is just the reply from epistemic luck—and it’s something I address in the full post.
“No, there is nothing wrong with the referents in the Gettier examples”
I will have to revisit this assumption when I have done a bit more research into the topic. This is an interesting question that I would like to follow more.
>The problem is not that the proposition refers to Jones.
Who the proposition refers to is always uncertain in Gettier cases—this is a fundamental fact about Gettier cases. I will safely discard this assumption.
>Within the universe of the scenario, it in fact did not.
This is an error in logic. Who the statement refers to, again, is unclear in the Gettier scenario. If you would like to know more about the nature of referents and the contentions about who they refer to, do some of your own research.
+ when you use the word ‘scenario’ here—you refer to two separate states of affairs.
>Smith’s mental model implied that the proposition referred to Jones, but Smith’s mental model was incorrect in this important respect.
This is the core issue that the paper attempts to work around. There are two conflicting positions: the mental model, and the reality of the situation. How we update our mental models in accordance with the reality of the situation is what is left unexplained within Gettier cases. So, in principle: I agree, and yet I disagree.
-->Due to this, the fact that the model correctly predicted the truth of the proposition was an accident.
This is a specious conclusion. What is accidental about the inherent ‘accident’ of language being indefinite? Words are not atoms. They do not exist separately from their contexts. Neither are they indelibly linked to their contexts.