I’m not sure how to answer the first question. I’m sure my introspection revealed all manner of things over the course of years, and I’m also not sure what level of specificity you are going for. I don’t want to evade actually reporting on the contents of my mental states, so perhaps a more specific question would help me form a useful response.
I may very well not have even the illusion of phenomenal consciousness, but I’m not sure I am alone in lacking it. While it remains an open empirical question, and I can’t vouch for the methodological rigor of any particular study, there is some empirical research on whether or not nonphilosophers are inclined towards thinking there is a hard problem of consciousness:
It may be that notions of qualia, and the kinds of views that predominate among academic philosophers are outliers that don’t represent how other people think about these issues, if they think about them at all.
I’m not sure how to answer the first question. I’m sure my introspection revealed all manner of things over the course of years, and I’m also not sure what level of specificity you are going for. I don’t want to evade actually reporting on the contents of my mental states, so perhaps a more specific question would help me form a useful response.
I may very well not have even the illusion of phenomenal consciousness, but I’m not sure I am alone in lacking it. While it remains an open empirical question, and I can’t vouch for the methodological rigor of any particular study, there is some empirical research on whether or not nonphilosophers are inclined towards thinking there is a hard problem of consciousness:
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2021/00000028/f0020003/art00002
It may be that notions of qualia, and the kinds of views that predominate among academic philosophers are outliers that don’t represent how other people think about these issues, if they think about them at all.