Nitpick: as I understand, Feyerabend would agree. His main argument seems to be “any simple methodology for deciding whether a scientific theory is true or false (such as falsificationism) would have missed important advances such as heliocentrism, Newton’s theory of gravity, and relativity, therefore philosophers of science should stop trying to formulate simple accept/reject methodologies.”
I think he argues that any methododology—not just any simple methodology—will fail in some cases. The reason is that there is something “irrational”, that is, irreducibly sociological, about scientific progess. I disagree because I think there is an optimal methodology for intellectual progess (Bayesian inference), and successful inference is ultimately reducible to approximations of it.
Bayesian inference only functions within known solution-space. Spotting things outside of known solution space, while rare, is essential for the progression of science – and can’t be modelled simply as Bayesian inference.
Nitpick: as I understand, Feyerabend would agree. His main argument seems to be “any simple methodology for deciding whether a scientific theory is true or false (such as falsificationism) would have missed important advances such as heliocentrism, Newton’s theory of gravity, and relativity, therefore philosophers of science should stop trying to formulate simple accept/reject methodologies.”
I think he argues that any methododology—not just any simple methodology—will fail in some cases. The reason is that there is something “irrational”, that is, irreducibly sociological, about scientific progess. I disagree because I think there is an optimal methodology for intellectual progess (Bayesian inference), and successful inference is ultimately reducible to approximations of it.
Bayesian inference only functions within known solution-space. Spotting things outside of known solution space, while rare, is essential for the progression of science – and can’t be modelled simply as Bayesian inference.