Logic is prior to physics. It could be the case that physics is different; it could not be the case that logic is different. (Put another way, logic occupies a higher level of the Tegmark multiverse, kind of; one can hypothesize a Tegmark V where logic is different. We don’t have a formal model of what “counterlogical reasoning” looks like yet, that is, reasoning about what it would be like if logic were different, whereas we have solid formal models of reasoning about what it would look like if physics were different (either in terms of dynamics or boundary conditions).)
You are saying that CDT don’t understand common causes.
Of an agent’s decisions, because the CDT procedure views actions as interventions, which uproot the relevant node (using the terminology of this paper), that is, delete all of its parents besides the intervention. Observations are distinct from interventions; on observing the weather online, CDT is able to infer about whether or not the grass is wet or dry. On editing the webpage to say that it is raining, CDT does not infer that the grass is wet—which is correct!
I literally just gave arguments about why it’s not the correct action. You repeating this and not countering any of the arguments I brought up doesn’t really help.
Suppose you are building a robot that will face this challenge, and programming what it does in the case where it sees that the box is full. You consider the performance of a one-boxer. It will see the $1M 99% of the time, and take only it, and see only the $1k 1% of the time, and take that. Total expected reward: $990,010.
A two-boxer will see the $1M 1% of the time, and take both, and see only the $1k 99% of the time, and take that. Total expected reward: $11,000.
Since you like money, you program the robot to one-box.
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To check, do you think it’s correct to pay the driver in Parfit’s Hitchhiker once you reach town?
Logic is prior to physics. It could be the case that physics is different; it could not be the case that logic is different. (Put another way, logic occupies a higher level of the Tegmark multiverse, kind of; one can hypothesize a Tegmark V where logic is different. We don’t have a formal model of what “counterlogical reasoning” looks like yet, that is, reasoning about what it would be like if logic were different, whereas we have solid formal models of reasoning about what it would look like if physics were different (either in terms of dynamics or boundary conditions).)
Of an agent’s decisions, because the CDT procedure views actions as interventions, which uproot the relevant node (using the terminology of this paper), that is, delete all of its parents besides the intervention. Observations are distinct from interventions; on observing the weather online, CDT is able to infer about whether or not the grass is wet or dry. On editing the webpage to say that it is raining, CDT does not infer that the grass is wet—which is correct!
Suppose you are building a robot that will face this challenge, and programming what it does in the case where it sees that the box is full. You consider the performance of a one-boxer. It will see the $1M 99% of the time, and take only it, and see only the $1k 1% of the time, and take that. Total expected reward: $990,010.
A two-boxer will see the $1M 1% of the time, and take both, and see only the $1k 99% of the time, and take that. Total expected reward: $11,000.
Since you like money, you program the robot to one-box.
---
To check, do you think it’s correct to pay the driver in Parfit’s Hitchhiker once you reach town?