There’s no merit, but for some rationalists it feels good to praise religious nuts every once in a while, just to show you’re not one of those uncouth anti-theists.
I will admit that there was definitely an element of what you describe in my motivations, though probably no more than about one third. (Another one third came from genuinely finding the argument interesting, and another one third from a deep-seated general annoyance towards the kind of tribalism in which everyone who thinks differently is dismissed as being stupid, evil, or otherwise unworthy.)
It takes a very valid concern (“don’t use your models beyond their domain of applicability”) which smart people are likely to agree with, and generalizes it to make an argument against reductionism. In order to realize what’s wrong with the argument, you need to be aware of concepts such as privileging the hypothesis, which many people aren’t. At the same time, it also appeals to people’s desire to not be extremists and take the middle ground. The combination of those two factors makes it very compelling for a certain kind of mindset.
I don’t see how (“don’t use your models beyond their domain of applicability”) is a relevant critique. Eliezer pretty much already addressed that in the sequences quite handily. Additionally it seems that you are praising the rhetoric, not the argument itself.
I said that the argument is interesting because it helps better understand how non-reductionists think, not because it’d convince somebody who’d read the Sequences. And yes, part of what made it interesting was seeing it use the kind of rhetoric that I felt would be persuasive to many, which helped further explain why they’d believe in it.
Can someone explain to me why this argument is considered interesting or good? I genuinely do not see the merit in it.
There’s no merit, but for some rationalists it feels good to praise religious nuts every once in a while, just to show you’re not one of those uncouth anti-theists.
I will admit that there was definitely an element of what you describe in my motivations, though probably no more than about one third. (Another one third came from genuinely finding the argument interesting, and another one third from a deep-seated general annoyance towards the kind of tribalism in which everyone who thinks differently is dismissed as being stupid, evil, or otherwise unworthy.)
It takes a very valid concern (“don’t use your models beyond their domain of applicability”) which smart people are likely to agree with, and generalizes it to make an argument against reductionism. In order to realize what’s wrong with the argument, you need to be aware of concepts such as privileging the hypothesis, which many people aren’t. At the same time, it also appeals to people’s desire to not be extremists and take the middle ground. The combination of those two factors makes it very compelling for a certain kind of mindset.
I don’t see how (“don’t use your models beyond their domain of applicability”) is a relevant critique. Eliezer pretty much already addressed that in the sequences quite handily. Additionally it seems that you are praising the rhetoric, not the argument itself.
I said that the argument is interesting because it helps better understand how non-reductionists think, not because it’d convince somebody who’d read the Sequences. And yes, part of what made it interesting was seeing it use the kind of rhetoric that I felt would be persuasive to many, which helped further explain why they’d believe in it.
That makes sense.