It’s possible for an article to be here’s why these 3 reasons why we might think counterfactuals are circular are all false
OK, so if I understand you correctly, you posit that there is something called ‘circular epistemology’. You said in the earlier post you link to at the top:
You might think that the circularity is a problem, but circular epistemology turns out to be viable (see Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom). And while circular reasoning is less than ideal, if the comparative is eventually hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all, then circular justification might not seem so bad after all.
You further suspect that circular epistemology might have something useful to say about counterfactuals, in terms of offering a justification for them without ‘hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all’. And you have a bounty for people writing more about this.
Yeah, I believe epistemology to be inherently circular. I think it has some relation to counterfactuals being circular, but I don’t see it as quite the same as counterfactuals seem a lot harder to avoid using than most other concept. The point of mentioning circular epistemology was to persuade people that my theory isn’t as absurd as it sounds at first.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
So I think I am still struggling to see what flavour of philosophical thought you want people to engage with, when you mention ‘circular’.
Mind you, I see ‘hitting a point where we provide no justification at all’ as a positive thing in a mathematical system, a physical theory, or an entire epistemology, as long as these points are clearly identified.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?
OK, so if I understand you correctly, you posit that there is something called ‘circular epistemology’. You said in the earlier post you link to at the top:
You further suspect that circular epistemology might have something useful to say about counterfactuals, in terms of offering a justification for them without ‘hitting a point where we can provide no justification at all’. And you have a bounty for people writing more about this.
Am I understanding you correctly?
Yeah, I believe epistemology to be inherently circular. I think it has some relation to counterfactuals being circular, but I don’t see it as quite the same as counterfactuals seem a lot harder to avoid using than most other concept. The point of mentioning circular epistemology was to persuade people that my theory isn’t as absurd as it sounds at first.
Wait, I was under the impression from the quoted text that you make a distinction between ‘circular epistemology’ and ‘other types of epistemology that will hit a point where we can provide no justification at all’. i.e. these other types are not circular because they are ultimately defined as a set of axioms, rewriting rules, and observational protocols for which no further justification is being attempted.
So I think I am still struggling to see what flavour of philosophical thought you want people to engage with, when you mention ‘circular’.
Mind you, I see ‘hitting a point where we provide no justification at all’ as a positive thing in a mathematical system, a physical theory, or an entire epistemology, as long as these points are clearly identified.
If you’re referring to the Wittgenstenian quote, I was merely quoting him, not endorsing his views.
Not aware of which part would be a Wittgenstenian quote. Long time ago that I read Wittgenstein, and I read him in German. In any case, I remain confused on what you mean with ‘circular’.
Hmm… Oh, I think that was elsewhere on this thread. Probably not to you. Eliezer’s Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom seems to embrace a circular epistemology despite its title.
He doesn’t show much sign of embracing the validity of all circular argument ss, and neither do you.
I never said all circular arguments are valid
That doesn’t help. If recursive justification is a particular kind of circular argument that’s valid, so that others are invalid, then something makes it valid. But what? EY doesn’t say. And how do we know that the additional factor isn’t doing all the work?