The truth need not be, and we shouldn’t demand that it be, something that we find desirable aside from its being the truth. (1)
What you are saying (I take it) is:
Once we know the truth for what it is, we should desire it on that account (2)
or maybe
Our desires should be such that they lead us to desire what is true (3)
neither of which is the same as what the quotation deplores. And neither of these is in fact the same as what the Litany of Tarski recommends, which is
We should desire that our opinion match the truth. (4)
Perhaps a few specific examples may help to clarify the distinctions.
2,3 versus 4: I desire to believe that I will be dead in a week if in fact I will be dead in a week (4). But I don’t see any reason why I should want to be dead in a week (3), nor would I be glad of being dead in a week if I learned I would be (2).
2 versus 3: Perhaps there is something to be said for an attitude of acceptance, whereby once I know I will be dead in a week I adjust my mental attitudes so as to be accepting, or even glad (2). But that doesn’t mean that ahead of time I should prefer being dead in a week to not being dead in a week, even if at that point it happens that I already have the aneurysm that’s going to kill me (3).
1 versus 2: (Almost identical to 2 versus 3, above.) Perhaps, if I find that I shall be dead in a week, I should adopt a positive attitude to that fact. But that doesn’t mean that being dead in a week should be something I find desirable if I don’t know it’s going to happen.
1 versus 3: These are both commenting on the question of whether our desires should match up with how the world is. But they have different focuses. #1 is saying that because they don’t always match, we shouldn’t use our desires as a guide to how the world is. But #3 is saying that we should use how the world is to help form our desires. Those are not necessarily in conflict.
Does this conflict with the Litany of Tarski?
On the contrary, this is what the Litany of Tarski states.
But by the Litany of Tarski, I want to desire the truth, I want the truth to be desirable.
The quotation (I take it) means:
What you are saying (I take it) is:
or maybe
neither of which is the same as what the quotation deplores. And neither of these is in fact the same as what the Litany of Tarski recommends, which is
Perhaps a few specific examples may help to clarify the distinctions.
2,3 versus 4: I desire to believe that I will be dead in a week if in fact I will be dead in a week (4). But I don’t see any reason why I should want to be dead in a week (3), nor would I be glad of being dead in a week if I learned I would be (2).
2 versus 3: Perhaps there is something to be said for an attitude of acceptance, whereby once I know I will be dead in a week I adjust my mental attitudes so as to be accepting, or even glad (2). But that doesn’t mean that ahead of time I should prefer being dead in a week to not being dead in a week, even if at that point it happens that I already have the aneurysm that’s going to kill me (3).
1 versus 2: (Almost identical to 2 versus 3, above.) Perhaps, if I find that I shall be dead in a week, I should adopt a positive attitude to that fact. But that doesn’t mean that being dead in a week should be something I find desirable if I don’t know it’s going to happen.
1 versus 3: These are both commenting on the question of whether our desires should match up with how the world is. But they have different focuses. #1 is saying that because they don’t always match, we shouldn’t use our desires as a guide to how the world is. But #3 is saying that we should use how the world is to help form our desires. Those are not necessarily in conflict.