an epistemic challenge (why would we expect our normative beliefs to correlate with the non-natural normative facts?) that realists have basically no answer to except “yeah idk but maybe this is a problem for math and philosophy too?”
i think this doesn’t help at all (the basic questions about how the non-natural realm interacts with the natural one remain unanswered—and this is a classic problem for non-physicalist theories of consciousness as well), but that it gets its appeal centrally via running through people’s confusion/mystery relationship with phenomenal consciousness, which muddies the issue enough to make it seem like the move might help.
It seems that you have a tendency to take “X’ists don’t have an answer to question Y” as strong evidence for “Y has no answer, assuming X” and therefore “not X”, whereas I take it as weak evidence for such because it seems pretty likely that even if Y has an answer given X, humans are just not smart enough to have found it yet. It looks like this may be the main crux that explains our disagreement over meta-ethics (where I’m much more of an agnostic).
but my general feeling is that the process of stepping away from the Joe and looking at the world as a whole tends to reduce its investment in what happens to Joe in particular
This doesn’t feel very motivating to me (i.e., why should I imagine idealized me being this way), absent some kind of normative force that I currently don’t know about (i.e., if there was a normative fact that I should idealize myself in this way). So I’m still in a position where I’m not sure how idealization should handle status issues (among other questions/confusions about it).
It seems that you have a tendency to take “X’ists don’t have an answer to question Y” as strong evidence for “Y has no answer, assuming X” and therefore “not X”, whereas I take it as weak evidence for such because it seems pretty likely that even if Y has an answer given X, humans are just not smart enough to have found it yet. It looks like this may be the main crux that explains our disagreement over meta-ethics (where I’m much more of an agnostic).
This doesn’t feel very motivating to me (i.e., why should I imagine idealized me being this way), absent some kind of normative force that I currently don’t know about (i.e., if there was a normative fact that I should idealize myself in this way). So I’m still in a position where I’m not sure how idealization should handle status issues (among other questions/confusions about it).