I’d propose is whether the participants are trying to maximize (and therefore learn a lot) or minimize (and therefore avoid conflict) the scope of the argument.
Interesting, though I’m not sure I fully understand your meaning. Do you mind elaborating your examples a touch?
American judges like to decide cases in ways that clarify undetermined areas of law as little as possible. This is oriented towards preserving the stability of the system. If a case can be decided on a technicality that allows a court to avoid opining on some broader issue, the court will often take that way out. Consider the US Supreme Court’s decision on the gay wedding cake—the court put off a decision on the core issue by instead finding a narrower procedural reason to doubt the integrity of the decisionmaking body that sanctioned the baker. Both sides in a case have an incentive to avoid asking courts to overturn precedents, since that reduces their chance of victory.
Plea bargains are another example where the thing the court is mainly trying to do is resolve conflicting interests with minimal work, not learn what happened.
In general, if you see the interesting thing about arguments as the social conflict, finding creative ways to avoid the need for the argument helps you defuse fights faster and more reliably, at the expense of learning.
By contrast, in science, the best experiments and ones scientists are rewarded for seeking out are ones that overturn existing models with high confidence. Surprising and new results are promoted rather than suppressed.
This is of course a bit of a stereotyped picture. Actual scientific fields resemble this to varying degrees, and of course there’s also non-disagreement-oriented data-gathering and initial model formation. But the ideal of falsification does matter. Activist lawyers will sometimes deliberately try to force a court to decide a large issue instead of a small one. And on the other hand, actual scientific research also includes non-disagreement-oriented data-gathering and initial model formation. But the ideal of falsification does matter in science and affects the discourse.
That is such a respectable social norm, to try and make as conservative a statement about norms as possible whenever you’re given the opportunity (as opposed to many people’s natural instincts which is to try to paint a big picture that seems important and true to them).
Could you clarify your references a bit? None of my guesses as to the connection between my comment and your reply are such a good fit as to make me confident that I’ve understood what you’re saying.
Interesting, though I’m not sure I fully understand your meaning. Do you mind elaborating your examples a touch?
American judges like to decide cases in ways that clarify undetermined areas of law as little as possible. This is oriented towards preserving the stability of the system. If a case can be decided on a technicality that allows a court to avoid opining on some broader issue, the court will often take that way out. Consider the US Supreme Court’s decision on the gay wedding cake—the court put off a decision on the core issue by instead finding a narrower procedural reason to doubt the integrity of the decisionmaking body that sanctioned the baker. Both sides in a case have an incentive to avoid asking courts to overturn precedents, since that reduces their chance of victory.
Plea bargains are another example where the thing the court is mainly trying to do is resolve conflicting interests with minimal work, not learn what happened.
In general, if you see the interesting thing about arguments as the social conflict, finding creative ways to avoid the need for the argument helps you defuse fights faster and more reliably, at the expense of learning.
By contrast, in science, the best experiments and ones scientists are rewarded for seeking out are ones that overturn existing models with high confidence. Surprising and new results are promoted rather than suppressed.
This is of course a bit of a stereotyped picture. Actual scientific fields resemble this to varying degrees, and of course there’s also non-disagreement-oriented data-gathering and initial model formation. But the ideal of falsification does matter. Activist lawyers will sometimes deliberately try to force a court to decide a large issue instead of a small one. And on the other hand, actual scientific research also includes non-disagreement-oriented data-gathering and initial model formation. But the ideal of falsification does matter in science and affects the discourse.
That is such a respectable social norm, to try and make as conservative a statement about norms as possible whenever you’re given the opportunity (as opposed to many people’s natural instincts which is to try to paint a big picture that seems important and true to them).
Could you clarify your references a bit? None of my guesses as to the connection between my comment and your reply are such a good fit as to make me confident that I’ve understood what you’re saying.
Thanks, that was clarifying and helpful.