Those are interesting empirical questions. Why jump to the conclusion?
I didn’t claim it was a proof that some sort of algorithm was running; but given the overall increased effectiveness at maximizing utility that seems to come with the experience of deliberation, I’d say it’s a very strongly supported hypothesis. (And to abuse a mathematical principle, the Church-Turing Thesis lends credence to the hypothesis: you can’t consistently compete with a good algorithm unless you’re somehow running a good algorithm.)
Do you have a specific hypothesis you think is better, or specific evidence that contradicts the hypothesis that some good decision algorithm is generally running during a deliberation?
Also, I think it’ll be instructive to check the latest neuroscience research on them. We no longer need to go straight to our intuitions as a beginning and end point.
Oh, I agree, and I’m fascinated too by modern neuroscientific research into cognition. It just seems to me that what I’ve read supports the hypothesis above.
I wonder if you’re bothered by Eliezer’s frequent references to our intuitions of our cognition rather than sticking to a more outside view of it. It seems to me that his picture of “free will as experience of a decision algorithm” does find support from the more objective outside view, but that he’s also trying to “dissolve the question” for those whose intuitions of introspection make an outside account “feel wrong” at first glance. It doesn’t seem that’s quite the problem for you, but it’s enough of a problem for others that I think he’s justified in spending time there.
Secondly, an illusion/myth/hallucination may be that you have the ultimate capacity to choose between “deliberation” (running some sort of decision tree/algorithm) and a random choice process in each given life instance...
Again, I don’t think that anyone actually chooses randomly; even the worst decisions come out with far too much order for that to be the case. There is a major difference in how aware people are of their real deliberations (which chiefly amounts to how honest they are with themselves), and those who seem more aware tend to make better decisions and be more comfortable with them. That’s a reason why I choose to try and reflect on my own deliberations and deliberate more honestly.
I don’t need some “ultimate capacity” to not-X in order for X to be (or feel like, if you prefer) my choice, though; I just need to have visualized the alternatives, seen no intrinsic impediments and felt no external constraints. That’s the upshot of this reinterpretation of free will, which both coincides with our feeling of freedom and doesn’t require metaphysical entities.
HA:
Those are interesting empirical questions. Why jump to the conclusion?
I didn’t claim it was a proof that some sort of algorithm was running; but given the overall increased effectiveness at maximizing utility that seems to come with the experience of deliberation, I’d say it’s a very strongly supported hypothesis. (And to abuse a mathematical principle, the Church-Turing Thesis lends credence to the hypothesis: you can’t consistently compete with a good algorithm unless you’re somehow running a good algorithm.)
Do you have a specific hypothesis you think is better, or specific evidence that contradicts the hypothesis that some good decision algorithm is generally running during a deliberation?
Also, I think it’ll be instructive to check the latest neuroscience research on them. We no longer need to go straight to our intuitions as a beginning and end point.
Oh, I agree, and I’m fascinated too by modern neuroscientific research into cognition. It just seems to me that what I’ve read supports the hypothesis above.
I wonder if you’re bothered by Eliezer’s frequent references to our intuitions of our cognition rather than sticking to a more outside view of it. It seems to me that his picture of “free will as experience of a decision algorithm” does find support from the more objective outside view, but that he’s also trying to “dissolve the question” for those whose intuitions of introspection make an outside account “feel wrong” at first glance. It doesn’t seem that’s quite the problem for you, but it’s enough of a problem for others that I think he’s justified in spending time there.
Secondly, an illusion/myth/hallucination may be that you have the ultimate capacity to choose between “deliberation” (running some sort of decision tree/algorithm) and a random choice process in each given life instance...
Again, I don’t think that anyone actually chooses randomly; even the worst decisions come out with far too much order for that to be the case. There is a major difference in how aware people are of their real deliberations (which chiefly amounts to how honest they are with themselves), and those who seem more aware tend to make better decisions and be more comfortable with them. That’s a reason why I choose to try and reflect on my own deliberations and deliberate more honestly.
I don’t need some “ultimate capacity” to not-X in order for X to be (or feel like, if you prefer) my choice, though; I just need to have visualized the alternatives, seen no intrinsic impediments and felt no external constraints. That’s the upshot of this reinterpretation of free will, which both coincides with our feeling of freedom and doesn’t require metaphysical entities.