This may not count, and it’s more of a fringe benefit anyway, but reading LW/EY gave me confidence that Many-Worlds is probably something that’s true about reality, and that in turn has practically eliminated my far-mode fear of death.
It seems like if you say “because of MW, I ought to anticipate all possibilities to be actualised”, you have to include possibilities such as “suddenly and apparently inexplicably undergoing the most extreme torture a human being can undergo” (as well as the inverse—but, really, we know they don’t cancel out), so if that were the correct interpretation of MW, it wouldn’t be a reason not to fell fear (although, yes, perhaps the fear of death in particular would go out the window).
However, it doesn’t seem like that is the correct interpretation of MW, because not all apparent branching points are in fact quantum branching points. If someone offers me a choice between orange juice and apple juice, and I prefer orange juice, I shouldn’t anticipate choosing orange juice in one universe and apple juice in another. I prefer orange juice, so I choose the orange juice.
This may not count, and it’s more of a fringe benefit anyway, but reading LW/EY gave me confidence that Many-Worlds is probably something that’s true about reality, and that in turn has practically eliminated my far-mode fear of death.
...why?
Because I don’t anticipate ever not finding myself to exist.
Does this also mean you can take any risks you want, and that Eliezer is wasting his time trying to save the world?
It seems like if you say “because of MW, I ought to anticipate all possibilities to be actualised”, you have to include possibilities such as “suddenly and apparently inexplicably undergoing the most extreme torture a human being can undergo” (as well as the inverse—but, really, we know they don’t cancel out), so if that were the correct interpretation of MW, it wouldn’t be a reason not to fell fear (although, yes, perhaps the fear of death in particular would go out the window).
However, it doesn’t seem like that is the correct interpretation of MW, because not all apparent branching points are in fact quantum branching points. If someone offers me a choice between orange juice and apple juice, and I prefer orange juice, I shouldn’t anticipate choosing orange juice in one universe and apple juice in another. I prefer orange juice, so I choose the orange juice.