Technological considerations of course determine what we can do and through that, what we actually end up doing. In that sense they’re a necessary component of moral ‘what to do’ calculations.
What I meant was that you should be able to order all physically-possible actions by your preference function—in this case by morality—and then cross out the ones you can’t actually achieve because you don’t have the necessary technology, and take the highest remaining action on the list.
If the availability of some technology (artificial wombs) would make you select a choice you don’t really want to select (declaring pre-implantation abortions immoral and illegal), then the thought experiment has helped us found a mistake in your proposed morality evaluation function (“a fetus can be aborted only if it couldn’t survive outside the mother’s body at that age”).
As for your example: calling the terminally ill human ‘a person’ presupposes they have full personhood and moral value, and so should be kept from death. Whereas for early fetuses I and others hold that they are not persons and therefore we don’t have a moral imperative to keep them alive no matter how easy it may be to do so.
Technological considerations of course determine what we can do and through that, what we actually end up doing. In that sense they’re a necessary component of moral ‘what to do’ calculations.
What I meant was that you should be able to order all physically-possible actions by your preference function—in this case by morality—and then cross out the ones you can’t actually achieve because you don’t have the necessary technology, and take the highest remaining action on the list.
If the availability of some technology (artificial wombs) would make you select a choice you don’t really want to select (declaring pre-implantation abortions immoral and illegal), then the thought experiment has helped us found a mistake in your proposed morality evaluation function (“a fetus can be aborted only if it couldn’t survive outside the mother’s body at that age”).
As for your example: calling the terminally ill human ‘a person’ presupposes they have full personhood and moral value, and so should be kept from death. Whereas for early fetuses I and others hold that they are not persons and therefore we don’t have a moral imperative to keep them alive no matter how easy it may be to do so.
I’ll be interested to hear what you mean by ‘a person’.
By ‘a person’ I meant ‘anyone or anything with moral weight’.