Safety, of course, is paramount. The good news is that, thanks to a debate that dates back to Asilomar in the 1970s, robust and diverse regulations for the safe use of biotechnology and recombinant-DNA technology are already firmly in place. However, we must be vigilant and never drop our guard. In years to come it might be difficult to identify agents of concern if they look like nothing we have encountered before. The political, societal, and scientific backdrop is continually evolving and has shifted a great deal since the days of Asilomar. Synthetic biology also relies on the skills of scientists who have little experience in biology, such as mathematicians and electrical engineers. As shown by the efforts of the budding synthetic biologists at iGEM, the field is no longer the province of highly skilled senior scientists only. The democratization of knowledge and the rise of “open-source biology”; the establishment of a biological design-build facility, BIOFAB in California; and the availability of kitchen-sink versions of key laboratory tools, such as the DNA-copying method PCR, make it easier for anyone — including those outside the usual networks of government, commercial, and university laboratories and the culture of responsible training and biosecurity — to play with the software of life.
There are also “biohackers” who want to experiment freely with the software of life. The theoretical physicist and mathematician Freeman Dyson has already speculated on what would happen if the tools of genetic modification became widely accessible in the form of domesticated biotechnology: “There will be do-it-yourself kits for gardeners who will use genetic engineering to breed new varieties of roses and orchids. Also kits for lovers of pigeons and parrots and lizards and snakes to breed new varieties of pets. Breeders of dogs and cats will have their kits too.”
Many have focused on the risks of this technology’s falling into the “wrong hands.” The events of September 11, 2001, the anthrax attacks that followed, and the H1N1 and H7N9 influenza pandemic threat have all underscored the need to take their concerns seriously. Bioterrorism is becoming ever more likely as the technology matures and becomes ever more available. However, it is not easy to synthesize a virus, let alone one that is virulent or infective, or to create it in a form that can be used in a practical way as a weapon. And, of course, as demonstrated by the remarkable speed with which we can now sequence a pathogen, the same technology makes it easier to counteract with new vaccines.
For me, a concern is “bioerror”: the fallout that could occur as the result of DNA manipulation by a non-scientifically trained biohacker or “biopunk.” As the technology becomes more widespread and the risks increase, our notions of harm are changing, along with our view of what we mean by the “natural environment” as human activities alter the climate and, in turn, change our world.
In a similar vein, creatures that are not “normal” tend to be seen as monsters, as the product of an abuse of power and responsibility, as most vividly illustrated by the story of Frankenstein. Still, it is important to maintain our sense of perspective and of balance. Despite the knee-jerk demands for ever more onerous regulation and control measures consistent with the “precautionary principle” — whatever we mean by that much-abused term — we must not lose sight of the extraordinary power of this technology to bring about positive benefits for the world.
Among its recommendations to the president, the commission said that the government should undertake a coordinated evaluation of public funding for synthetic-biology research, including studies on techniques for risk assessment and risk reduction and on ethical and social issues, so as to reveal noticeable gaps, if one considered that “public good” should be the main aim. The recommendations were, fortunately, pragmatic: given the embryonic state of the field, innovation should be encouraged, and, rather than creating a traditional system of bureaucracy and red tape, the patchwork quilt of regulation and guidance of the field by existing bodies should be coordinated.
Concerns were, of course, expressed about “low-probability, potentially high-impact events,” such as the creation of a doomsday virus. These rare but catastrophic possibilities should not be ignored, given that we are still reeling from the horrors of September 11. Nor should they be overstated: though one can gain access to “dangerous” viral DNA sequences, obtaining them is a long way from growing them successfully in a laboratory. Still, the report stated that safeguards should be instituted for monitoring, containment, and control of synthetic organisms — for instance, by the incorporation of “suicide genes,” molecular “brakes,” “kill switches,” or “seatbelts” that restrain growth rates or require special diets, such as novel amino acids, to limit their ability to thrive outside the laboratory. As was the case with our “branded” bacterium, we need to find new ways to label and tag synthetic organisms. More broadly, the report called for international dialogue about this emerging technology, as well as adequate training to remind all those engaged in this work of their responsibilities and obligations, not least to biosafety and stewardship of biodiversity, ecosystems, and food supplies. Though it encouraged the government to back a culture of self-regulation, it also urged it to be vigilant about the possibilities of do-it-yourself synthetic biology being carried out in what it called “noninstitutional settings.” One problem facing anyone who casts a critical eye over synthetic biology is that the field is evolving so quickly. For that reason, assessments of the technology should be under rolling review, and we should be ready to introduce new safety and control measures as necessary.
I shared one quote here. More from Life at the Speed of Light:
Also from Life at the Speed of Light: