I don’t understand what “the underlying causality I am part of” can possibly mean, since causality is a human way to model observations. This statement seems to use the mind projection fallacy to invert the relationship between map and territory.
If you want to discount the use of causal models as merely a “human way to model observations” (one that presumably bears no underlying connection to whatever is generating those observations), then you will need to explain why they work so well. The set of all possible sequences of observations is combinatorially large, and the supermajority of those sequences admit no concise description—they contain no regularity or structure that would allow us to substantially compress their length without losing information. The fact that our observations do seem to be structured, therefore, is a very improbable coincidence indeed. The belief in an external reality is simply a rejection of the notion that this extremely improbable circumstance is a coincidence.
If you want to discount the use of causal models as merely a “human way to model observations” (one that presumably bears no underlying connection to whatever is generating those observations), then you will need to explain why they work so well. The set of all possible sequences of observations is combinatorially large, and the supermajority of those sequences admit no concise description—they contain no regularity or structure that would allow us to substantially compress their length without losing information. The fact that our observations do seem to be structured, therefore, is a very improbable coincidence indeed. The belief in an external reality is simply a rejection of the notion that this extremely improbable circumstance is a coincidence.