I’m not sure I understand you. Do you think that right now there exist an infinite number of physically separate bodies that collectively make up current you and all have identical experiences (including this conversation), that exactly one of those bodies is the real (?) you, and that every distinct possible future you can be traced back to one particular body or a distinct subset of those physical bodies? If so what is your basis for believing that? And is this true for any possible mechanism that could produce copies, or do you refuse to acknowledge copies that are produced in a way that doesn’t preserve this quality as possible yous?
Do you think that right now there exist an infinite number of physically separate bodies that collectively make up current you
No, I don’t think it’s normally the case (I presume you’re referring to quantum branches?).
But the Anthropic Trilemma scenario we’re discussing explicitly postulates this: that physically separate but identical copies of my body will be constructed, have identical experiences for a while, and then diverge.
If this scenario is actually implemented, then it will be necessarily true that (given complete knowledge of the universe) every distinct future body can be traced back to a past body at a point before the experiences diverge.
This would not be true, though, in Eliezer’s other thought experiment about persons implemented as 2D circuits that can be split along their thickness.
But in the scenario here, if there are two bodies and one is going to be tortured tomorrow, there can be a fact of the matter today about which one it is, even if the bodies themselves don’t know it. Even though their presents are identical (to the limit that they can experience), the fact that their futures are going to be different can make it necessary to talk about two separate persons existing all along.
That’s not what I was talking about though, I was talking about the perspective of the root. Obviously once you already are in a branch there is a fact as to whether you are in that branch, even if you can’t tell yourself.
But the Anthropic Trilemma scenario we’re discussing explicitly postulates this: that physically separate but identical copies of my body will be constructed, have identical experiences for a while, and then diverge.
Not as far as I can tell. The first experience after being copied is either winning the lottery or not.
I’m not sure I understand you. Do you think that right now there exist an infinite number of physically separate bodies that collectively make up current you and all have identical experiences (including this conversation), that exactly one of those bodies is the real (?) you, and that every distinct possible future you can be traced back to one particular body or a distinct subset of those physical bodies? If so what is your basis for believing that? And is this true for any possible mechanism that could produce copies, or do you refuse to acknowledge copies that are produced in a way that doesn’t preserve this quality as possible yous?
No, I don’t think it’s normally the case (I presume you’re referring to quantum branches?).
But the Anthropic Trilemma scenario we’re discussing explicitly postulates this: that physically separate but identical copies of my body will be constructed, have identical experiences for a while, and then diverge.
If this scenario is actually implemented, then it will be necessarily true that (given complete knowledge of the universe) every distinct future body can be traced back to a past body at a point before the experiences diverge.
This would not be true, though, in Eliezer’s other thought experiment about persons implemented as 2D circuits that can be split along their thickness.
But in the scenario here, if there are two bodies and one is going to be tortured tomorrow, there can be a fact of the matter today about which one it is, even if the bodies themselves don’t know it. Even though their presents are identical (to the limit that they can experience), the fact that their futures are going to be different can make it necessary to talk about two separate persons existing all along.
That’s not what I was talking about though, I was talking about the perspective of the root. Obviously once you already are in a branch there is a fact as to whether you are in that branch, even if you can’t tell yourself.
Not as far as I can tell. The first experience after being copied is either winning the lottery or not.