Like most philosophical paradoxes the error is hidden in innocuous seeming premises. In this case it is the assumption that there is any substantive notion of individual identity (see ship of theseus for good reasons why not).
We get a cleaner theory and avoid these problems if we just stipulate that there are experiences. Certain experiences happen to be similar to others that occured in the near past and others don’t. Period end of story.
So sure you could wake up a trillion copies and have them experience lottery happiness but why bother with the lottery, modify their code so they feel the most intense euphoria possible and keep running those sims.
Like most philosophical paradoxes the error is hidden in innocuous seeming premises. In this case it is the assumption that there is any substantive notion of individual identity (see ship of theseus for good reasons why not).
We get a cleaner theory and avoid these problems if we just stipulate that there are experiences. Certain experiences happen to be similar to others that occured in the near past and others don’t. Period end of story.
So sure you could wake up a trillion copies and have them experience lottery happiness but why bother with the lottery, modify their code so they feel the most intense euphoria possible and keep running those sims.