Happy to see someone else defending non-materialism since I see it as underrated. Some thoughts:
Nah, it can’t account for what an “observation” is so can’t really explain observations
This is really the heart of the issue. Is an observation qualia or some purely material process in our brain?
I should adopt the explanation that best explains my observation
Seems like a distraction? If the observations are materialist than materialism can explain the materialist-myness; if they are qualatic that we need qualia to define the qualiatic-myness. Merely knowing qualia have a property of my-ness doesn’t tell us which type. And it would seem unusual to say, know that myness is qualiatic without first knowing observations are qualiatic, since we can’t directly experience our myness, only our observations.
It has to do some ontological reshuffling around what “observations” are that, I think, undermines the case for believing in physics in the first place, which is that it explains my observations
Why does it undermine physics?
I think it makes more sense to think of mental things as existing subjectively (i.e. if they belong to you) and physical things as existing objectively. I definitely think that dualism is making a mistake in thinking of objectively-existing mental things
This relates quite closely to my post on Relabellings vs. External References. If mental things are just a relabelling of materialism, they don’t actually add anything be being present in the model. In order to actually change the system, they need to refer to external entities, in which case mental things aren’t really subjective any more.
Say I don’t believe in physics and you’re trying to get me to believe in physics. What sort of evidence can you show me? The most obvious is to do some experiments so I can see the results. Without this I wouldn’t have (epistemic, normative) reason to believe in physics.
The case for believing in physics needs to talk about all of (a) the thing causing experimental results, (b) the experimental results, (c) the epistemic process that, upon seeing (b), should believe in (a).
If someone said “actually, there’s no such thing as (c), there’s just (a) and (b)”, then that’s going to be hard to argue for, epistemically/normatively, since there is a denial of the existence of epistemology.
If the observations are materialist than materialism can explain the materialist-myness; if they are qualatic that we need qualia to define the qualiatic-myness.
Whether “my observations” are qualia or materialist, they’re still deictic; I get stuff from my eyes but not your eyes.
As long as the norm for explanations is that they’re supposed to explain these, the explanation has to say e.g. why these observations are coming from my eyes and not yours (or, indeed, from an inanimate object like a rock).
The most “view-from-nowhere” way of doing this is anthropics, which still needs to talk about mental entities (observers).
Trying to say something like “there is just the wave function, there are no observers” is insufficient for predicting these data; you need additional posits (e.g. Born rule, e.g. functionalism to define what an observer is).
I am not really importantly distinguishing qualia-observations from “the data my cognitive process is trying to explain” here. It seems like even an account that somehow doesn’t believe in qualia still needs to have data that it explains, hence running into similar issues.
If someone said “actually, there’s no such thing as (c), there’s just (a) and (b)”, then that’s going to be hard to argue for, epistemically/normatively, since there is a denial of the existence of epistemology.
Physics can explain the epistemic component in your brain—it just can’t explain the experience of believing or cognition in general.
I am not really importantly distinguishing qualia-observations from “the data my cognitive process is trying to explain” here. It seems like even an account that somehow doesn’t believe in qualia still needs to have data that it explains, hence running into similar issues.
The data to be explained are the experiences—say of seeing red or feeling pain. If you take that data to be the red brain process, that can be explained purely materialistically. The red brain process only needs a materialistic observer—ie. some kind of central processing unit—what’s wrong with this? It’s only qualia that needs the observer to have a non-materialistic component.
Physics can explain the epistemic component in your brain
Physics can’t say what an epistemic component is. Physics says what particle configurations have more amplitude given a starting state. You can define a bridge law that says “epistemic component = this particle configuration”. But that’s you doing the bridging, not physics. In doing this bridging you are doing cognition about mental processes (“epistemic components”). You’d have to derive/justify/etc whatever theory you’re using for the bridging by relating the mental to the physical.
If you take that data to be the red brain process, that can be explained purely materialistically.
This justificatory chain is not well-founded. Saying “my observations = brain processes” only makes sense if I can conceptualize physics and believe in it (otherwise, how do I know what a brain process is or think it is identical with my observations?). So as a justification for physics, it’s circular.
Here’s a brief statement of my position. “Why believe in physics? Because it explains observations. Whose observations? Those of whoever is considering believing in physics.” Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion.
Insofar as the epistemic component consists of logic, physics can’t say what that logic is ontologically. On the other hand, it can describe how brain states are linked to physical states, which should be sufficient to explain materialistic-observations.
That said, I agree that starting with subjective experience as our initial foundations is in one sense more empirical than starting with the external world as we can derive the external world’s existence from patterns in subjective experience.
Physics doesn’t say what shoppingcentres are..there a difference between being unable to solve a problem in principle , and leaving details to be filled in.
Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion
You also shouldn’t assume they are non physical. In fact, observers and observations can be treated in a neutral way that doesn’t beg any metaphysical questions.
Happy to see someone else defending non-materialism since I see it as underrated. Some thoughts:
This is really the heart of the issue. Is an observation qualia or some purely material process in our brain?
Seems like a distraction? If the observations are materialist than materialism can explain the materialist-myness; if they are qualatic that we need qualia to define the qualiatic-myness. Merely knowing qualia have a property of my-ness doesn’t tell us which type. And it would seem unusual to say, know that myness is qualiatic without first knowing observations are qualiatic, since we can’t directly experience our myness, only our observations.
Why does it undermine physics?
This relates quite closely to my post on Relabellings vs. External References. If mental things are just a relabelling of materialism, they don’t actually add anything be being present in the model. In order to actually change the system, they need to refer to external entities, in which case mental things aren’t really subjective any more.
Say I don’t believe in physics and you’re trying to get me to believe in physics. What sort of evidence can you show me? The most obvious is to do some experiments so I can see the results. Without this I wouldn’t have (epistemic, normative) reason to believe in physics.
The case for believing in physics needs to talk about all of (a) the thing causing experimental results, (b) the experimental results, (c) the epistemic process that, upon seeing (b), should believe in (a).
If someone said “actually, there’s no such thing as (c), there’s just (a) and (b)”, then that’s going to be hard to argue for, epistemically/normatively, since there is a denial of the existence of epistemology.
Whether “my observations” are qualia or materialist, they’re still deictic; I get stuff from my eyes but not your eyes.
As long as the norm for explanations is that they’re supposed to explain these, the explanation has to say e.g. why these observations are coming from my eyes and not yours (or, indeed, from an inanimate object like a rock).
The most “view-from-nowhere” way of doing this is anthropics, which still needs to talk about mental entities (observers).
Trying to say something like “there is just the wave function, there are no observers” is insufficient for predicting these data; you need additional posits (e.g. Born rule, e.g. functionalism to define what an observer is).
I am not really importantly distinguishing qualia-observations from “the data my cognitive process is trying to explain” here. It seems like even an account that somehow doesn’t believe in qualia still needs to have data that it explains, hence running into similar issues.
Physics can explain the epistemic component in your brain—it just can’t explain the experience of believing or cognition in general.
The data to be explained are the experiences—say of seeing red or feeling pain. If you take that data to be the red brain process, that can be explained purely materialistically. The red brain process only needs a materialistic observer—ie. some kind of central processing unit—what’s wrong with this? It’s only qualia that needs the observer to have a non-materialistic component.
Physics can’t say what an epistemic component is. Physics says what particle configurations have more amplitude given a starting state. You can define a bridge law that says “epistemic component = this particle configuration”. But that’s you doing the bridging, not physics. In doing this bridging you are doing cognition about mental processes (“epistemic components”). You’d have to derive/justify/etc whatever theory you’re using for the bridging by relating the mental to the physical.
This justificatory chain is not well-founded. Saying “my observations = brain processes” only makes sense if I can conceptualize physics and believe in it (otherwise, how do I know what a brain process is or think it is identical with my observations?). So as a justification for physics, it’s circular.
Here’s a brief statement of my position. “Why believe in physics? Because it explains observations. Whose observations? Those of whoever is considering believing in physics.” Epistemically, these observations can’t be considered “already-physical”, that’s assuming the conclusion.
Insofar as the epistemic component consists of logic, physics can’t say what that logic is ontologically. On the other hand, it can describe how brain states are linked to physical states, which should be sufficient to explain materialistic-observations.
Circularity is inevitable (I like the arguments in Where Recursive Justification Hits Bottom), so this isn’t as problematic as it seems.
That said, I agree that starting with subjective experience as our initial foundations is in one sense more empirical than starting with the external world as we can derive the external world’s existence from patterns in subjective experience.
Physics doesn’t say what shoppingcentres are..there a difference between being unable to solve a problem in principle , and leaving details to be filled in.
You also shouldn’t assume they are non physical. In fact, observers and observations can be treated in a neutral way that doesn’t beg any metaphysical questions.