In the meantime I hit upon the theisms of Leibniz and Aquinas and other semi-neo-Platonistic academic-style philosophers, taking a computational decision theoretic perspective while trying to do justice to their hypotheses and avoiding syncretism. Ultimately I think that academic “the form of the good and the form of being are the same” theism is a less naive perspective on cosmology-morality than atheism is—you personally should expect to be at equilibrium with respect to any timeless interaction that ends up at-least-partially-defining what “right” is, and pretending like you aren’t or are only negligibly watched over by a superintelligence—whether a demiurge, a pantheonic economy, a monolithic God, or any other kind of institution—is like asking to fail the predictable retrospective stupidity test. The actual decision theory is more nuanced—you always want to be on the edge of uncertainty, you don’t want to prop up needlessly suboptimal institutions or decision policies even timelessly, &c.---but pragmatically speaking this gets swamped by the huge amount of moral uncertainty that we have to deal with until our decision theories are better equipped to deal with such issues.
In what sense is this paragraph supposed to be distinguishable from gibberish?
In what sense is this paragraph supposed to be distinguishable from gibberish?
It always comes to this, doesn’t it?