I’m the primary researcher working on Connection Theory at Leverage. I don’t have time to give an in-depth argument for why I consider CT to be worth investigating at the moment, but I will briefly respond to your post:
Objections I & II:
I think that your skeptical position is reasonable given your current state of knowledge. I agree that the existing CT documents do not make a persuasive case.
The CT research program has not yet begun. The evidence presented in the CT documents is from preliminary investigations carried out shortly after the theory’s creation when Geoff was working on his own.
My current plan is a follows: Come to understand CT and how to apply it well enough to design (and be able to carry out) a testing methodology that will provide high quality evidence. Perform some preliminary experiments. If the results are promising, create training material and programs that produce researchers who reliably create the same charts, predictions and recommendations from the same data. Recruit many aspiring researchers. Train many researchers. Begin large-scale testing.
Objection III:
I agree that a casual reading of CT suggests that it conflicts with existing science. I thought so as well and initially dismissed the theory for just that reason. Several extended conversations with Geoff and the experience of having my CT chart created convinced me otherwise. Very briefly:
The brain is complicated and the relationship between brain processes and our everyday experience of acting and updating is poorly understood. Since CT is trying to be a maximally elegant theory of just these things, CT does not attempt to say anything one way or the other about the brain and so strictly speaking does not predict that beliefs can be changed by modifying the brain. That said, it is easy to specify a theory, which we might call CT’, that is identical in every respect except that it allows beliefs to be modified directly by altering the brain.
“Elegant updating” is imprecisely defined in the current version of CT. This is definitely a problem with the theory. That said, I don’t think the concept is hopelessly imprecise. For one, elegant updating as defined by CT does not mean ideal Bayesian updating. One of the criteria of elegance is that the update involve the fewest changes from the previous set of beliefs. This means that a less globally-elegant theory may be favored over a more globally-elegant theory due to path-dependence. This introduces another source of less-than-optimally-rational beliefs. If we imagine a newly formed CT-compliant mind with a very minimal belief system updating in accordance with this conception of elegance and the constraints from their intrinsic goods (IGs), I think we should actually expects its beliefs to be totally insane, even more so than the H&B literature would suggest. Of course, we will need to do research in developmental psychology to confirm this suspicion.
It is surprisingly easy to explain many common biases within the CT framework. The first bias you mentioned, scope insensitivity, is an excellent example. Studies have shown that the amount people are willing to donate to save 2,000 birds is about the same as what they are willing to donate to save 200,000 birds. Why might that be?
According to CT, people only care about something if it is part of a path to one of their IGs. The IGs we’ve observed so far are mostly about particular relationships with other people, group membership, social acceptance, pleasure and sometimes ideal states of the world (world-scale IGs or WSIGs) such as world peace, universal harmony or universal human flourishing. Whether or not many birds (or even humans!) die in the short term is likely to be totally irrelevant to whether or not a person’s IGs are eventually fulfilled. Even WSIGs are unlikely to compel donation unless the person believes their donation action to be a necessary part of a strategy in which a very large number of people donate (and thus produce the desired state). It just isn’t very plausible that your individual attempt to save a small number of lives through donation will be critical to the eventual achievement of universal flourishing (for example). That leaves social acceptance as the next most likely explanation for donation. Since the number of social points people get from donating tends not to scale very well, there is no reason to expect the amount that they donate to scale. This is not the only possible CT-compliant explanation for scope insensitivity, but my guess is that it is the most commonly applicable.
I’ll close by saying that, like Geoff, I do not believe that CT is literally true. My current belief is that it is worthy of serious investigation and that the approach to psychology that it has inspired—that of mapping out individual beliefs and actions in a detailed and systematic manner, will be of great value even if the theory itself turns out to not be.
I’ll close by saying that, like Geoff, I do not believe that CT is literally true. My current belief is that it is worthy of serious investigation and that the approach to psychology that it has inspired—that of mapping out individual beliefs and actions in a detailed and systematic manner, will be of great value even if the theory itself turns out to not be.
FWIW, the idea of a person’s belief system having some fundamental criteria has been influential on my work with what I call EPIC beliefs (beliefs that are necessary for a person to see themselves and the world as having Esteem, Predict/ability, and being an Independent Collaborator).
However, I have not found intermediate mapping of beliefs to be all that helpful, since the kinds of things I help people with tend to center on concrete childhood experiences (or patterns thereof), and most all of the relevant beliefs can be found by inspecting the six layers or belief classes I call SAMMSA (Surface, Attitude, Model, Mirror, Shadow, and Assumptions).
EPIC and SAMMSA are the result of spending a lot of time mapping my own and others’ beliefs and looking for common structural patterns, and mostly noticing that even among people with experience at RMI or Gendlin’s Focusing, it’s hard to keep the mapping exercise tied to concrete emotional beliefs without wandering off into all sorts of random distractions.
Based on my own experience, I would suggest that EPIC is a more basic or fundamental model than IG’s are, and that IGs are simply things people believe are necessary conditions for themselves or the world to be EPIC—i.e., basically good, fair, predictable/masterable, with a place for them to participate in a meaningful “higher” purpose than just existing, by their own free choice.
I also don’t think that “elegant updating” is or should be a premise in CT: compare with PCT’s model of “reorganization”, and you’ll see that their model is more basic: stuff gets rewired until the conflict goes away, and “elegant” is defined evolutionarily, i.e., what you get is what’s easiest for your brain to rewire to, not what necessarily involves the most human-level elegance of belief update.
By the way, when I was first referred to the CT website, my first reaction to the “evidence” put forth on the site amounted to, “ugh… these guys don’t understand what ‘evidence’ means”. It was very off-putting. Nonetheless, as I said, I did manage to take away the idea of IG-as-belief-mediator; I just didn’t find your approach to be radically different from what’s already in PCT and the Method of Levels, which also assume we have a hierarchy of goods determining our behavior, and suggest mapping some portion of that hierarchy in order to change behavior. I’d strongly suggest, before embarking on new research in that area, that you check out what already exists for PCT theory and its clinical spin-off, the Method of Levels.
PCT looks very interesting and your EPIC goal framework strikes me as intuitively plausible. The current list of IGs that we reference is not so much part of CT as an empirical finding from our limited experience building CT charts. Neither Geoff nor I believe that all of them are actually intrinsic. It is entirely possible that we and our subjects are simply insufficiently experienced to penetrate below them. It looks like I’ve got a lot reading to do :-)
I’m being charted by Jasen, and I may be wrong about this, but it seems that it is comparatively harder to find my Intrinsic Goods than it was to find the intrinsic goods of most people who were CT-charted, even though Jasen called my chart very straightforward to do.
For one thing, I know that CT can’t literally be true because evolution is true and CT is not evolutionary.
the comment above on nomothetic vs. idiographic partly explains that.
But maybe CT can help people think about themselves by creating a model of them more complete. Maybe it works for some kinds of people, like super-goal-oriented-rationalists, but not for the average joe (or me).
If the update system of CT encompassed evolutionarily easy mind-paths for change, and saw genetic goals besides intrinsic goods, I think it could become an outstanding idographic theory of mind, and that is why I’m being charted!
Hey Peter,
Thanks for writing this.
I’m the primary researcher working on Connection Theory at Leverage. I don’t have time to give an in-depth argument for why I consider CT to be worth investigating at the moment, but I will briefly respond to your post:
Objections I & II:
I think that your skeptical position is reasonable given your current state of knowledge. I agree that the existing CT documents do not make a persuasive case.
The CT research program has not yet begun. The evidence presented in the CT documents is from preliminary investigations carried out shortly after the theory’s creation when Geoff was working on his own.
My current plan is a follows: Come to understand CT and how to apply it well enough to design (and be able to carry out) a testing methodology that will provide high quality evidence. Perform some preliminary experiments. If the results are promising, create training material and programs that produce researchers who reliably create the same charts, predictions and recommendations from the same data. Recruit many aspiring researchers. Train many researchers. Begin large-scale testing.
Objection III:
I agree that a casual reading of CT suggests that it conflicts with existing science. I thought so as well and initially dismissed the theory for just that reason. Several extended conversations with Geoff and the experience of having my CT chart created convinced me otherwise. Very briefly:
The brain is complicated and the relationship between brain processes and our everyday experience of acting and updating is poorly understood. Since CT is trying to be a maximally elegant theory of just these things, CT does not attempt to say anything one way or the other about the brain and so strictly speaking does not predict that beliefs can be changed by modifying the brain. That said, it is easy to specify a theory, which we might call CT’, that is identical in every respect except that it allows beliefs to be modified directly by altering the brain.
“Elegant updating” is imprecisely defined in the current version of CT. This is definitely a problem with the theory. That said, I don’t think the concept is hopelessly imprecise. For one, elegant updating as defined by CT does not mean ideal Bayesian updating. One of the criteria of elegance is that the update involve the fewest changes from the previous set of beliefs. This means that a less globally-elegant theory may be favored over a more globally-elegant theory due to path-dependence. This introduces another source of less-than-optimally-rational beliefs. If we imagine a newly formed CT-compliant mind with a very minimal belief system updating in accordance with this conception of elegance and the constraints from their intrinsic goods (IGs), I think we should actually expects its beliefs to be totally insane, even more so than the H&B literature would suggest. Of course, we will need to do research in developmental psychology to confirm this suspicion.
It is surprisingly easy to explain many common biases within the CT framework. The first bias you mentioned, scope insensitivity, is an excellent example. Studies have shown that the amount people are willing to donate to save 2,000 birds is about the same as what they are willing to donate to save 200,000 birds. Why might that be?
According to CT, people only care about something if it is part of a path to one of their IGs. The IGs we’ve observed so far are mostly about particular relationships with other people, group membership, social acceptance, pleasure and sometimes ideal states of the world (world-scale IGs or WSIGs) such as world peace, universal harmony or universal human flourishing. Whether or not many birds (or even humans!) die in the short term is likely to be totally irrelevant to whether or not a person’s IGs are eventually fulfilled. Even WSIGs are unlikely to compel donation unless the person believes their donation action to be a necessary part of a strategy in which a very large number of people donate (and thus produce the desired state). It just isn’t very plausible that your individual attempt to save a small number of lives through donation will be critical to the eventual achievement of universal flourishing (for example). That leaves social acceptance as the next most likely explanation for donation. Since the number of social points people get from donating tends not to scale very well, there is no reason to expect the amount that they donate to scale. This is not the only possible CT-compliant explanation for scope insensitivity, but my guess is that it is the most commonly applicable.
I’ll close by saying that, like Geoff, I do not believe that CT is literally true. My current belief is that it is worthy of serious investigation and that the approach to psychology that it has inspired—that of mapping out individual beliefs and actions in a detailed and systematic manner, will be of great value even if the theory itself turns out to not be.
FWIW, the idea of a person’s belief system having some fundamental criteria has been influential on my work with what I call EPIC beliefs (beliefs that are necessary for a person to see themselves and the world as having Esteem, Predict/ability, and being an Independent Collaborator).
However, I have not found intermediate mapping of beliefs to be all that helpful, since the kinds of things I help people with tend to center on concrete childhood experiences (or patterns thereof), and most all of the relevant beliefs can be found by inspecting the six layers or belief classes I call SAMMSA (Surface, Attitude, Model, Mirror, Shadow, and Assumptions).
EPIC and SAMMSA are the result of spending a lot of time mapping my own and others’ beliefs and looking for common structural patterns, and mostly noticing that even among people with experience at RMI or Gendlin’s Focusing, it’s hard to keep the mapping exercise tied to concrete emotional beliefs without wandering off into all sorts of random distractions.
Based on my own experience, I would suggest that EPIC is a more basic or fundamental model than IG’s are, and that IGs are simply things people believe are necessary conditions for themselves or the world to be EPIC—i.e., basically good, fair, predictable/masterable, with a place for them to participate in a meaningful “higher” purpose than just existing, by their own free choice.
I also don’t think that “elegant updating” is or should be a premise in CT: compare with PCT’s model of “reorganization”, and you’ll see that their model is more basic: stuff gets rewired until the conflict goes away, and “elegant” is defined evolutionarily, i.e., what you get is what’s easiest for your brain to rewire to, not what necessarily involves the most human-level elegance of belief update.
By the way, when I was first referred to the CT website, my first reaction to the “evidence” put forth on the site amounted to, “ugh… these guys don’t understand what ‘evidence’ means”. It was very off-putting. Nonetheless, as I said, I did manage to take away the idea of IG-as-belief-mediator; I just didn’t find your approach to be radically different from what’s already in PCT and the Method of Levels, which also assume we have a hierarchy of goods determining our behavior, and suggest mapping some portion of that hierarchy in order to change behavior. I’d strongly suggest, before embarking on new research in that area, that you check out what already exists for PCT theory and its clinical spin-off, the Method of Levels.
Link for the confused: PCT is Perceptual Control Theory.
Thanks for the info PJ!
PCT looks very interesting and your EPIC goal framework strikes me as intuitively plausible. The current list of IGs that we reference is not so much part of CT as an empirical finding from our limited experience building CT charts. Neither Geoff nor I believe that all of them are actually intrinsic. It is entirely possible that we and our subjects are simply insufficiently experienced to penetrate below them. It looks like I’ve got a lot reading to do :-)
I’m being charted by Jasen, and I may be wrong about this, but it seems that it is comparatively harder to find my Intrinsic Goods than it was to find the intrinsic goods of most people who were CT-charted, even though Jasen called my chart very straightforward to do.
For one thing, I know that CT can’t literally be true because evolution is true and CT is not evolutionary. the comment above on nomothetic vs. idiographic partly explains that.
But maybe CT can help people think about themselves by creating a model of them more complete. Maybe it works for some kinds of people, like super-goal-oriented-rationalists, but not for the average joe (or me).
If the update system of CT encompassed evolutionarily easy mind-paths for change, and saw genetic goals besides intrinsic goods, I think it could become an outstanding idographic theory of mind, and that is why I’m being charted!