Another approach might be to go meta. Assume that there are many dire threats theoretically possible which, if true, would justify a person in the sole position stop them, doing so at near any cost (from paying a penny or five pounds, all the way up to the person cutting their own throat, or pressing a nuke launching button that would wipe out the human species). Indeed, once the size of action requested in response to the threat is maxed out (it is the biggest response the individual is capable of making), all such claims are functionally identical—the magnitiude of the threat beyond that needed to max out the response, is irrelevant. In this context, there is no difference between 3↑↑↑3 and 3↑↑↑↑3 .
But, what policy upon responding to claims of such threats, should a species have, in order to maximise expected utility?
The moral hazard from encouraging such claims to be made falsely needs to be taken into account.
It is that moral hazard which has to be balanced against a pool of money that, species wide, should be risked on covering such bets. Think of it this way: suppose I, Pascal’s Policeman, were to make the claim “On behalf of the time police, in order to deter confidence tricksters, I hereby guarantee that an additional utility will be added to the multiverse equal in magnitude to the sum of all offers made by Pascal Muggers that happen to be telling the truth (if any), in exchange for your not responding positively to their threats or offers.”
It then becomes a matter of weighing the evidence presented by different muggers and policemen.
Another approach might be to go meta. Assume that there are many dire threats theoretically possible which, if true, would justify a person in the sole position stop them, doing so at near any cost (from paying a penny or five pounds, all the way up to the person cutting their own throat, or pressing a nuke launching button that would wipe out the human species). Indeed, once the size of action requested in response to the threat is maxed out (it is the biggest response the individual is capable of making), all such claims are functionally identical—the magnitiude of the threat beyond that needed to max out the response, is irrelevant. In this context, there is no difference between 3↑↑↑3 and 3↑↑↑↑3 .
But, what policy upon responding to claims of such threats, should a species have, in order to maximise expected utility?
The moral hazard from encouraging such claims to be made falsely needs to be taken into account.
It is that moral hazard which has to be balanced against a pool of money that, species wide, should be risked on covering such bets. Think of it this way: suppose I, Pascal’s Policeman, were to make the claim “On behalf of the time police, in order to deter confidence tricksters, I hereby guarantee that an additional utility will be added to the multiverse equal in magnitude to the sum of all offers made by Pascal Muggers that happen to be telling the truth (if any), in exchange for your not responding positively to their threats or offers.”
It then becomes a matter of weighing the evidence presented by different muggers and policemen.