In another debate with Bill Craig, atheist Christopher Hitchens gave this objection: “Who designed the Designer? Don’t you run the risk… of asking ‘Well, where does that come from? And where does that come from?’ and running into an infinite regress?” But this is an elementary misunderstanding in philosophy of science. Why? Because every successful scientific explanation faces the exact same problem. It’s called the “why regress” because no matter what explanation is given of something, you can always still ask “Why?”
IMO, it is perfectly reasonable to object with: “Who designed the Designer?”.
The logic being objected to is: it takes a big complex thing to create another big complex thing. Observing that Darwinian evolution makes big complex things from scratch is the counter-example. The intuition that a complex thing (humans) requires another complex thing to create it (god) is wrong—and it does tend to lead towards an escalator of ever-more-complex creators.
Simplicity creating complexity needs to happen somewhere, to avoid an infinite regress—and if such a principle has to be invoked somewhere, then before the very first god is conjoured seems like a good place.
Hitchens did not mention complexity or simplicity as you propose. And he did not mention evolution as you propose. If you read the Hitchens quote, you will see he only gave the why-regress objection, which is just as valid against any scientific hypothesis as it is against a theistic one.
There are ways to make the “Who designed the Designer?” objection stick, but Hitchens did not use one of them. If you read the Hitchens quote, you’ll see that he explicitly gave the why-regress objection that could be just as accurately be given to any scientific hypothesis ever proposed.
Here, let’s play Quick Word Substitution. Let’s say a physicist gives a brilliant demonstration of why his theory of quarks does a great job explaining a wide variety of observed subatomic phenomena. Now, Hitchens objects:
“But what explains the quarks? Don’t you run the risk… of asking ‘Well, where does that come from? And where does that come from?’ and running into an infinite regress?”
Hitchens explicitly gave the why-regress objection that is just as potent against scientific explanations as it is against theistic explanations.
The regress down into smaller and smaller particles may be a special case. Can we throw out particle physics, and still say we have science? I think so.
The why-regress is not concerned with ontological reduction into smaller and smaller bits. It is concerned with explanatory reduction into more and more fundamental explanations.
The why-regress is not limited to particle physics. It is just as present at higher-level sciences. When neuroscientists successfully explain certain types of pleasure in terms of the delivery of dopamine and endorphins to certain parts of the brain, it does not defeat this explanation to say, “But what explains this particular way of sending dopamine and endorphins to certain parts of the brain? Don’t you run the risk of asking ‘Well, where does that come from? And where does that come from?’ and running into an infinite regress?”
The point is that all explanations are subject to the why-regress, whether they are theistic or scientific explanations.
More specifically it is completely rational to use that argument against theists, because one of their arguments for god is that the world is too complex not to have been designed; so in that circumstance you are just pointing out that their claim is just pushing the complexity back one step. If the world is so complex that it needs a designer, then so is god.
Ooh, I like that one. Call it the “sweet spot” theory of intelligent design—things of high enough complexity must be designed, but only if they are under a certain complexity, at which point they must be eternal.
(And apparently also personal and omnibenevolent, for some reason).
At any rate, this would all be nice and dandy were it not completely arbitrary… Though if we had an agreed upon measure for complexity and could measure enough relevant objects, we might possibly actually be able to devise a test of sorts for this.
Well, at least for the lower bound. Seeing as we can’t actually show that something is eternal, the upper bound can always be pushed upwards a-la the invisible dragon’s permeability to flour.
(And apparently also personal and omnibenevolent, for some reason).
Well, if it’s eternal and sufficiently powerful, a kind of omnibenevolence might follow, insofar as it exerts a selection pressure on the things it feels benevolent towards, which over time will cause them to predominate.
After all, even humans might (given enough time in which to act) cause our environment to be populated solely with things towards which we feel benevolent, simply by wiping out or modifying everything else.
The canonical Christian Hell might also follow from this line of reasoning as the last safe place, where all the refugees from divine selection pressure ended up.
Granted, most Christians would be horrified by this model of divine omnibenevolence; the canonical version presumes an in-principle universal benevolence, not a contingent one.
Well, if it’s eternal and sufficiently powerful, a kind of omnibenevolence might follow, insofar as it exerts a selection pressure on the things it feels benevolent towards, which over time will cause them to predominate.
Unless it decides that it wants to keep things it hates around to torture them
There is an upper bound to the complexity of things designed by humans, but why would there be an upper bound on the complexity of things that are designed, in general?
Pointing out that setting a rule leads to infinite regress is not the same as requiring that everything being used to explain must also be explained. In fact, this is a flaw with Intelligent Design, not its critics.
Now, the theists have a loophole to answer the question (“only physical complex things require a designer” special pleading), but it does not render the question “who designed the designer”—which should be rephrased “why doesn’t necessitating a designer lead to infinite regress”—meaningless under the rules of science.
Not the greatest example in this, Luke. Especially jarring since you just recently quoted Maitzen on the “so what” infinite regress argument against Ultimate Purpose.
Which part of my example do you disagree with? Do you disagree with my claim that Hitchens’ objection concerned the fact that the theistic explanation is subject to the why-regress? Do you disagree with my claim that all scientific explanations are also subject to the why-regress?
The discussion of Maitzen and Craig did not involve a why-regress of causal explanations. I’m not sure why you think that discussion is relevant here.
I disagree with the claim that Hitchens’ objection invokes the why-regress as it applies to science. It invokes an infinite regression that is a consequence of the Intelligent Design claim (things above a certain threshold necessitate a designer); much like Maitzen invoking an infinite regress that might be entailed by applying the “so what” question to every purpose statement.
To make this clearer: The problem with Intelligent Design is precisely that it demands an explanation exist, and that the explanation be a designer. Hitchens’ objection is in-line with us not requiring an explanation for the fundamentals.
Science is not subject to the same infinite regress, because science does not set a rule that everything must have an explanation, and certainly not an explanation of a certain kind. Science may define a certain class of phenomena as having a certain explanation, but it never sets the explanation as necessarily requiring the same explanation to explain it. Hitchens points this flaw as a logical consequence of the ID claim.
IMO, it is perfectly reasonable to object with: “Who designed the Designer?”.
The logic being objected to is: it takes a big complex thing to create another big complex thing. Observing that Darwinian evolution makes big complex things from scratch is the counter-example. The intuition that a complex thing (humans) requires another complex thing to create it (god) is wrong—and it does tend to lead towards an escalator of ever-more-complex creators.
Simplicity creating complexity needs to happen somewhere, to avoid an infinite regress—and if such a principle has to be invoked somewhere, then before the very first god is conjoured seems like a good place.
Checking with the “common sense atheism” link quite a few people are saying similar things in the comments.
timtyler,
Hitchens did not mention complexity or simplicity as you propose. And he did not mention evolution as you propose. If you read the Hitchens quote, you will see he only gave the why-regress objection, which is just as valid against any scientific hypothesis as it is against a theistic one.
There are ways to make the “Who designed the Designer?” objection stick, but Hitchens did not use one of them. If you read the Hitchens quote, you’ll see that he explicitly gave the why-regress objection that could be just as accurately be given to any scientific hypothesis ever proposed.
Here, let’s play Quick Word Substitution. Let’s say a physicist gives a brilliant demonstration of why his theory of quarks does a great job explaining a wide variety of observed subatomic phenomena. Now, Hitchens objects:
“But what explains the quarks? Don’t you run the risk… of asking ‘Well, where does that come from? And where does that come from?’ and running into an infinite regress?”
Hitchens explicitly gave the why-regress objection that is just as potent against scientific explanations as it is against theistic explanations.
The regress down into smaller and smaller particles may be a special case. Can we throw out particle physics, and still say we have science? I think so.
PhilGoetz,
The why-regress is not concerned with ontological reduction into smaller and smaller bits. It is concerned with explanatory reduction into more and more fundamental explanations.
The why-regress is not limited to particle physics. It is just as present at higher-level sciences. When neuroscientists successfully explain certain types of pleasure in terms of the delivery of dopamine and endorphins to certain parts of the brain, it does not defeat this explanation to say, “But what explains this particular way of sending dopamine and endorphins to certain parts of the brain? Don’t you run the risk of asking ‘Well, where does that come from? And where does that come from?’ and running into an infinite regress?”
The point is that all explanations are subject to the why-regress, whether they are theistic or scientific explanations.
Also, see the part of Yudkowsky’s Technical Explanation of Technical Explanation that begins with “Beware of checklist thinking...”
More specifically it is completely rational to use that argument against theists, because one of their arguments for god is that the world is too complex not to have been designed; so in that circumstance you are just pointing out that their claim is just pushing the complexity back one step. If the world is so complex that it needs a designer, then so is god.
I think tighter definitions are needed here, some theistic traditions consider all existence to be ‘god’ etc.
Unless God is too complex to be designed :P
Ooh, I like that one. Call it the “sweet spot” theory of intelligent design—things of high enough complexity must be designed, but only if they are under a certain complexity, at which point they must be eternal. (And apparently also personal and omnibenevolent, for some reason).
At any rate, this would all be nice and dandy were it not completely arbitrary… Though if we had an agreed upon measure for complexity and could measure enough relevant objects, we might possibly actually be able to devise a test of sorts for this.
Well, at least for the lower bound. Seeing as we can’t actually show that something is eternal, the upper bound can always be pushed upwards a-la the invisible dragon’s permeability to flour.
Well, if it’s eternal and sufficiently powerful, a kind of omnibenevolence might follow, insofar as it exerts a selection pressure on the things it feels benevolent towards, which over time will cause them to predominate.
After all, even humans might (given enough time in which to act) cause our environment to be populated solely with things towards which we feel benevolent, simply by wiping out or modifying everything else.
The canonical Christian Hell might also follow from this line of reasoning as the last safe place, where all the refugees from divine selection pressure ended up.
Granted, most Christians would be horrified by this model of divine omnibenevolence; the canonical version presumes an in-principle universal benevolence, not a contingent one.
Unless it decides that it wants to keep things it hates around to torture them
Or God is in the first Quine-capable level of some designer hierarchy, like a Universal Turing Machine among lesser models of computation.
If God is complex, then I guess he’s not real :-)
ObNitpick—actually, R is a subset of C, so this doesn’t follow.
God = 3.
There is an upper bound to the complexity of things designed by humans, but why would there be an upper bound on the complexity of things that are designed, in general?
Indeed.
Pointing out that setting a rule leads to infinite regress is not the same as requiring that everything being used to explain must also be explained. In fact, this is a flaw with Intelligent Design, not its critics.
Now, the theists have a loophole to answer the question (“only physical complex things require a designer” special pleading), but it does not render the question “who designed the designer”—which should be rephrased “why doesn’t necessitating a designer lead to infinite regress”—meaningless under the rules of science.
Not the greatest example in this, Luke. Especially jarring since you just recently quoted Maitzen on the “so what” infinite regress argument against Ultimate Purpose.
Polymeron,
Which part of my example do you disagree with? Do you disagree with my claim that Hitchens’ objection concerned the fact that the theistic explanation is subject to the why-regress? Do you disagree with my claim that all scientific explanations are also subject to the why-regress?
The discussion of Maitzen and Craig did not involve a why-regress of causal explanations. I’m not sure why you think that discussion is relevant here.
lukeprog,
I disagree with the claim that Hitchens’ objection invokes the why-regress as it applies to science. It invokes an infinite regression that is a consequence of the Intelligent Design claim (things above a certain threshold necessitate a designer); much like Maitzen invoking an infinite regress that might be entailed by applying the “so what” question to every purpose statement.
To make this clearer: The problem with Intelligent Design is precisely that it demands an explanation exist, and that the explanation be a designer. Hitchens’ objection is in-line with us not requiring an explanation for the fundamentals.
Science is not subject to the same infinite regress, because science does not set a rule that everything must have an explanation, and certainly not an explanation of a certain kind. Science may define a certain class of phenomena as having a certain explanation, but it never sets the explanation as necessarily requiring the same explanation to explain it. Hitchens points this flaw as a logical consequence of the ID claim.