I would be very surprised if information in the brain were insufficient to reconstruct a (simulation of a) subjectively indistinguishable body. (You also have genetic information, but the brain should be sufficient.)
I thought the point of Lakoff et al. was that cognition is shaped by genetically encoded and/or learned physiological metaphors, not that the body plays much of an active role in cognition, let alone that it stores enough long-term state that its loss would be a severe problem for cryonics. The existence of mentally normal quadruplegics falsifies strong forms of the latter claim, though I have heard claims that paralysis dulls emotion.
I would be very surprised if information in the brain were insufficient to reconstruct a (simulation of a) subjectively indistinguishable body. (You also have genetic information, but the brain should be sufficient.)
I thought the point of Lakoff et al. was that cognition is shaped by genetically encoded and/or learned physiological metaphors, not that the body plays much of an active role in cognition, let alone that it stores enough long-term state that its loss would be a severe problem for cryonics. The existence of mentally normal quadruplegics falsifies strong forms of the latter claim, though I have heard claims that paralysis dulls emotion.