Thanks for the link; it’s an interesting dialogue. May I suggest, by way of constructive criticism, that when someone challenges you to play Rationalist’s Taboo, you respond with a formal definition that uses few or no pronouns, regardless of whether you think you have already defined your terms well?
E.g.:
First-order preference (n): a desire for some state X that, if unopposed, usually leads to actions calculated or assumed to bring X about.
Second-order preference (n): a meta-preference; a desire to have some particular ranking R of first-order preferences that, if unopposed, will usually lead to actions calculated or assumed to bring R about.
Akrasia (n): the state of having a first-order preference A that conflicts with a second-order preference B such that A is stronger, and usually wins.
Addiction (n): a subset of akrasia such that, if the person with akrasia were temporarily and forcibly prevented from acting on A, he/she would (1) be grateful AND (2) likely have a reduced preference for A in the future.
Thank you, that’s a great formalism. Under your terminology, my position is that there is a difference between someone with addiction, vs. someone with consistent first/second-order preferences, and that this difference is so empirically significant as to justify having different terms, and that this difference is experimentally detectable (at least in hypothetical situations).
Of course, your definitions define addiction by that experimental difference, and that’s something I’d want to avoid.
Vladimir_M’s point, in turn, is that people with consistent first/second order preferences that are not socially acceptable try to persuade others it is actually a case of addiction in order to increase the net benefit of indulging that preference. I agree with him that this is often what’s going on, but disagree that it can account for all cases, thereby necessitating the distinction of the separate category of akrasia (and addiction).
Thanks for the link; it’s an interesting dialogue. May I suggest, by way of constructive criticism, that when someone challenges you to play Rationalist’s Taboo, you respond with a formal definition that uses few or no pronouns, regardless of whether you think you have already defined your terms well?
E.g.:
First-order preference (n): a desire for some state X that, if unopposed, usually leads to actions calculated or assumed to bring X about.
Second-order preference (n): a meta-preference; a desire to have some particular ranking R of first-order preferences that, if unopposed, will usually lead to actions calculated or assumed to bring R about.
Akrasia (n): the state of having a first-order preference A that conflicts with a second-order preference B such that A is stronger, and usually wins.
Addiction (n): a subset of akrasia such that, if the person with akrasia were temporarily and forcibly prevented from acting on A, he/she would (1) be grateful AND (2) likely have a reduced preference for A in the future.
Thank you, that’s a great formalism. Under your terminology, my position is that there is a difference between someone with addiction, vs. someone with consistent first/second-order preferences, and that this difference is so empirically significant as to justify having different terms, and that this difference is experimentally detectable (at least in hypothetical situations).
Of course, your definitions define addiction by that experimental difference, and that’s something I’d want to avoid.
Vladimir_M’s point, in turn, is that people with consistent first/second order preferences that are not socially acceptable try to persuade others it is actually a case of addiction in order to increase the net benefit of indulging that preference. I agree with him that this is often what’s going on, but disagree that it can account for all cases, thereby necessitating the distinction of the separate category of akrasia (and addiction).