If the only way to get a clearer picture of the world—to enhance it epistemically, as it were—were to make it much better to start with, would the Utilitarians finally have found an argument that convinces any epistemic rationalist?
Only if there were no uncertainty about what “better” meant.
Is the idea that, because people naturally shy away from bad info, making the world better also makes it easier (on the emotions) to understand?
...Very interesting. That is a thought that’s going to fester, in a good way.
That is a very important subset of what I had in mind. So I`m glad you made that subset salient, as it seems independently important.
You could think more generally that if the world is more altruistic, morally enhanced, etc… there will be less externalities of bad kinds operating, and the instruments we use to understand the world would become more effective at so doing. A very simplified version is that because this would be a richer world, more institutions would have spare resources to grasp it.