I’d say that only a part of the section on falsifiability is nonsense, not the whole thing.
Paragraph 2 is reasonable. Physically speaking, you more or less have 2 options: Arbitrary objects either can be placed in superposition, or they can’t. Unsurprisingly, this is experimentally testable by trying to put progressively larger and larger objects into superposition and seeing if you are successful. (Or more complicated objects, or more massive objects, whatever.) This also has practical consequences for our ability to build quantum computers.
Paragraph 3 is speculative, but also reasonable: If you believe that arbitrary objects can be placed into superposition, then you had better believe that applies to very massive objects and their gravitational fields. This experiment hasn’t been done yet, but it could be done in principle, and it’s even possible to do without messing around with supermassive black holes or Planck-energy accelerators. [1]
Paragraph 4 is a super sketchy anthropic-style argument that should definitely have been left out.
Paragraph 5 is about simplicity, which is great and all, but doesn’t really bear on how falsifiable a theory is. Also should have been left out, or at least moved to the section on simplicity. (The simplicity advantage of decoherence over objective collapse theories is overrated IMO. Yes, decoherence is probably somewhat simpler than objective collapse, but only by a handful of Kolmogorov bits. Not really enough to be conclusive, so we should just do the experiments.)
I’d say that only a part of the section on falsifiability is nonsense, not the whole thing.
Paragraph 2 is reasonable. Physically speaking, you more or less have 2 options: Arbitrary objects either can be placed in superposition, or they can’t. Unsurprisingly, this is experimentally testable by trying to put progressively larger and larger objects into superposition and seeing if you are successful. (Or more complicated objects, or more massive objects, whatever.) This also has practical consequences for our ability to build quantum computers.
Paragraph 3 is speculative, but also reasonable: If you believe that arbitrary objects can be placed into superposition, then you had better believe that applies to very massive objects and their gravitational fields. This experiment hasn’t been done yet, but it could be done in principle, and it’s even possible to do without messing around with supermassive black holes or Planck-energy accelerators. [1]
Paragraph 4 is a super sketchy anthropic-style argument that should definitely have been left out.
Paragraph 5 is about simplicity, which is great and all, but doesn’t really bear on how falsifiable a theory is. Also should have been left out, or at least moved to the section on simplicity. (The simplicity advantage of decoherence over objective collapse theories is overrated IMO. Yes, decoherence is probably somewhat simpler than objective collapse, but only by a handful of Kolmogorov bits. Not really enough to be conclusive, so we should just do the experiments.)
[1] https://physics.aps.org/articles/v10/s138