SurvivalBias

• SurvivalBias 22 Sep 2022 2:03 UTC

  2 points

  2

  in reply to: oumuamua’s comment on: Can you define “util­ity” in util­i­tar­i­anism with­out us­ing words for spe­cific hu­man emo­tions?

  No, they are not. Animals can feel e.g. happiness as well.

  Yeah but the problem here is that we perceive happiness in animals only in as much as it looks like our own happiness. Did you notice that the closer an animal to a human the more likely we are to agree it can feel emotions? An ape can definitely display something like a human happiness, so we’re pretty sure it can experience it. A dog can display something mostly like human happiness so most likely they can feel it too. A lizard—meh, maybe but probably not. An insect, most people would say no. Maybe I’m wrong and there’s an argument that animals can experience happiness which is not based on their similarity to us, in that case I’m very curious to see this argument.

  Sentience

  For the record, I believe we do have at least crude mechanistic model of how consciousness works in general, and yes what’s with the hard problem of consciousness in particular (the latter being a bit of a wrong question).

  Otherwise, I actually think it somewhat answers my question. One my qualm would be that sentience does seem to come on a spectrum—but that can in theory be addressed by some scaling factor. The bigger issue for me is that it implies that a hardcore total utilitarian would be fine with a future populated by trillions of sentient but otherwise completely alien AIs successfully achieving their alien goals (e.g. maximizing paperclips) and experiencing desirable-state-of-consciousness about it. But I think some hardcore utilitarians would bite this bullet, and that wouldn’t be a biggest bullet for a utilitarian to bite either.

• SurvivalBias 21 Sep 2022 20:08 UTC

  5 points

  4

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: Can you define “util­ity” in util­i­tar­i­anism with­out us­ing words for spe­cific hu­man emo­tions?

  >Utility itself is an abstraction over the level of satisfaction of goals/​preferences about the state of the universe for an entity.

  You can say that a robot toy has a goal of following a light source. Or thermostat has a goal of keeping the room temperature at a certain setting. But I’m yet to hear anyone counting those things towards total utility calculations.

  Of course a counterargument would be “but those are not actual goals, those are the goals of humans that set it”, but in this case you’ve just hidden all the references to humans into the word “goal” and are back to square 1.

• SurvivalBias 21 Sep 2022 20:02 UTC

  1 point

  0

  in reply to: Viktor Rehnberg’s comment on: Can you define “util­ity” in util­i­tar­i­anism with­out us­ing words for spe­cific hu­man emo­tions?

  So utility theory is a useful tool, but as far as I understand it’s not directly used as a source of moral guidance (although I assume once you have some other source you can use utility theory to maximize it). Whereas utilitarianism as a metaethics school is concerned exactly with that, and you can hear people in EA talking about “maximizing utility” as the end in and of itself all the time. It was in this latter sense that I was asking.

• SurvivalBias 15 Jun 2022 23:07 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Yonatan Cale’s comment on: AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities

  To start off, I don’t see much point in formally betting $20 on an event conditioned on something I assign <<50% probability of happening within the next 30 years (powerful AI is launched and failed catastrophically and we’re both still alive to settle the bet and there was an unambiguous attribution of the failure to the AI). I mean sure, I can accept the bet, but largely because I don’t believe it matters one way or another, so I don’t think it counts from the epistemological virtue standpoint.

  But I can state what I’d disagree with in your terms if I were to take it seriously, just to clarify my argument:

  1. Sounds good.

  2. Mostly sounds good, but I’d push back that “not actually running anything close to the dangerous limit” sounds like a win to me, even if theoretical research continues. One pretty straightforward Schelling point for a ban/​moratorium on AGI research is “never train or run anything > X parameters”, with X << dangerous level at then-current paradigm. It may be easier explain to the public and politicians than many other potential limits, and this is important. It’s much easier to control too—checking that nobody collects and uses a gigashitton of GPUs [without supervision] is easier than to check every researcher’s laptop. Additionally, we’ll have nuclear weapons tests as a precedent.

  3. That’s the core of my argument, really. If the consortium of 200 world experts says “this happened because your AI wasn’t aligned, let’s stop all AI research”, then Facebook AI or China can tell the consortium to go fuck themselves, and I agree with your skepticism that it’d make all labs pause for even a month (see: gain of function research, covid). But if it becomes public knowledge that a catastrophe of 1mln casualties happened because of AI, then it can trigger a panic which will make both the world leaders and the public to really honestly want to restrict this AI stuff, and it will both justify and enable the draconian measures required to make every lab to actually stop the research. Similar to how panics about nuclear energy, terrorism and covid worked. I propose defining “public agreement” as “leaders of the relevant countries (defined as the countries housing the labs from p.1, so US, China, maybe UK and a couple of others) each issue a clear public statement saying that the catastrophe happened because of an unaligned AI”. This is not an unreasonable ask, they were this unanimous about quite a few things, including vaccines.

• SurvivalBias 14 Jun 2022 20:46 UTC

  2 points

  −1

  in reply to: AdamB’s comment on: AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities

  What Steven Byrnes said, but also my reading is that 1) in the current paradigm it’s near-damn-impossible to built such an AI without creating an unaligned AI in the process (how else do you gradient-descend your way into a book on aligned AIs?) and 2) if you do make an unaligned AI powerful enough to write such a textbook, it’ll probably proceed to converting the entire mass of the universe into textbooks, or do something similarly incompatible with human life.

• SurvivalBias 14 Jun 2022 20:39 UTC

  2 points

  0

  in reply to: Yonatan Cale’s comment on: AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities

  It might, given some luck and that all the pro-safety actors play their cards right. Assuming by “all labs” you mean “all labs developing AIs at or near to then-current limit of computational power”, or something along those lines, and by “research” you mean “practical research”, i.e. training and running models. The model I have in mind not that everyone involved will intellectually agree that such research should be stopped, but that enough percentage of public and governments will get scared and exert pressure on the labs. Consider how most of the world was able to (imperfectly) coordinate to slow Covid spread, or how nobody have prototyped a supersonic passenger jet in decades, or, again, the nuclear energy—we as a species can do such things in principle, even though often for the wrong reasons.

  I’m not informed enough to give meaningful probabilities on this, but to honor the tradition, I’d say that given a catastrophe with immediate, graphic death toll >=1mln happening in or near the developed world, I’d estimate >75% probability that ~all seriously dangerous activity will be stopped for at least a month, and >50% that it’ll be stopped for at least a year. With the caveat that the catastrophe was unambiguously attributed to the AI, think “Fukushima was a nuclear explosion”, not “Covid maybe sorta kinda plausibly escaped from the lab but well who knows”.

• SurvivalBias 14 Jun 2022 19:17 UTC

  2 points

  −2

  in reply to: Mitchell_Porter’s comment on: AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities

  The important difference is that the nuclear weapons are destructive because they worked exactly as intended, and the AI in this scenario is destructive because it failed horrendously. Plus, the concept of rogue AI has been firmly ingrained into public consciousness by now, afaik not the case with the extremely destructive weapons in 1940s ^[1]. So hopefully this will produce more public outrage (and scare among the elites themselves) ⇒ stricter external and internal limitations on all agents developing AIs. But in the end I agree, it’ll only buy time, maybe few decades if we are lucky, to solve the problem properly or to build more sane political institutions.

  1. ^

     Yes I’m sure there was a scifi novel or two before 1945 describing bombs of immense power. But I don’t think it was anywhere nearly as widely known as Matrix or Terminator.

• SurvivalBias 13 Jun 2022 23:41 UTC

  1 point

  0

  on: AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities

  How possible is it that a misaligned, narrowly-superhuman AI is launched, fails catastrophically with casualties in the 10^4 − 10^9 range, and the [remainder of] humanity is “scared straight” and from that moment onward treats the AI technology the way we treat nuclear technology now—i.e. effectively strangles it into stagnation with regulations—or even more conservatively? From my naive perspective it is somewhat plausible politically, based on the only example of ~world-destroying technology that we have today. And this list of arguments doesn’t seem to rule out this possibility. Is there an independent argument by EY as to why this is not plausible technologically? I.e., why AIs narrow/​weak enough to not be inevitably world-destroying but powerful enough to fail catastrophically are unlikely to be developed [soon enough]?

  (To be clear, the above scenario is nothing like a path to victory and I’m not claiming it’s very likely. More like a tiny remaining possibility for our world to survive.)

• SurvivalBias 22 Feb 2022 1:41 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Martin Randall’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  Yes and no. 1-6 are obviously necessary but not sufficient—there’s much more to diet and exercise than “not too much” and “some” respectively. 7 and 8 are kinda minor and of dubious utility except for in some narrow circumstances so whatever. And 9 and 10 are hotly debated and that’s exactly what you’d need rationality for, as well as figuring out the right pattern of diet and exercise. And I mean right for each individual person, not in general, and the same with supplements—a 60-year old should have much higher tolerance for potential risks of a longevity treatment than a 25yo, since the latter has more less to gain and more to loose.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 16:16 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: ChristianKl’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  I would be very surprised if inflammation or loss of proteostasis did not have any effect on fascia, if only because they have negative effect on ~everything. But more importantly, I don’t think there’s any significant number of people dying from fascia stiffness? That’s one of the main ideas behind the hallmarks of aging, that you don’t have to solve the entire problem in its every minuscule aspect at once. If you could just forestall all these hallmarks or even just some of them, you could probably increase lifespan and healthspan significantly, thus buying more time to fix other problems (or develop completely knew approaches like mind uploading or regenerative medicine or whatever else).

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 16:01 UTC

  3 points

  in reply to: superads91’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  You’re fighting a strawman (nobody’s going to deny death to anyone, and except for seriously ill most people who truly want to die now have an option to do so; myself I’m actually pro-euthanasia). And, once again, you want to inflict on literally everyone a fate you say you don’t want for yourself. Also, I don’t accept the premise there’s any innate power balance in the universe that we ought to uphold even at the cost of our lives, we do not inhabit a Marvel movie. And you’re assuming the knowledge which you can’t possibly have, about exactly how human consciousness functions and what alterations to it we’ll be able to make in the next centuries or millennia.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 15:52 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  That’s, like, 99.95% probability, one in two thousand chances. You’d have two orders of magnitude higher chances of survival if you were to literally shoot yourself with a literal gun. I’m not sure you can forecast anything at all (about humans or technologies) with this degree of certainty decades into the future, definitely not that every single one of dozens attempts in a technology you’re not an expert in fail and every single one of hundreds attempts in another technology you’re not an expert in fail (building aligned AGI).

  I don’t believe there are any tradeoffs I can make which would give me a 50% chance to live to 300 years.

  I don’t believe it either, it’s a thought experiment, I assumed it’d be obvious since it’s a very common technique to estimate how much one should value low probabilities.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 5:26 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  Equating high risk/​high reward strategies with Pascal Wager is a way too common failure mode, and it’s helped by putting numbers on your estimates. How much is VERY TINY, how much do you think the best available options really cost, and how much would you be willing to pay (assuming you have that kind of money) for a 50% chance of living to 300 years?

  To be clear, I’m not so much trying to convince you personally, as to get a generally better sense of the inferential distances involved.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:54 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  but that’s not anywhere near solving it in principle

  Of course they are not, that’s not the point. The point is that they can add more time for us to discover more cures—to the few decades most rationalists already have, considering the age distribution. During that time new approaches will likely be discovered, hopefully adding even more time, until we get to mind uploading, or nanobots constantly repairing the body, or some other complete solution. The concept is called longevity escape velocity.

  but I think it’s more likely for bio-brains to continue dying and the immortal are digital from birth

  Why would you think that?

  And another question. Imagine you’ve found yourself with an incurable disease and 3 years to live. Moreover, it’s infectious and it has infected everyone you love. Would you try experimental cures and encourage them to try as well, or would you just give up so as not to reduce your enjoyment of the remaining time?

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:40 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Martin Randall’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  Oh no, what if me and everyone I care about would only get to live 5 billion instead of 80 years. And all that only to find out it was a half-assed hypothetical.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:32 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: superads91’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  Just a reminder, in this argument we are not the modern people who get to feel all moral and righteous about themselves, we are the Greeks. Do you really want to die for some hypothetical moral improvement of future generations? If so, you can go ahead and be my guest, but myself I’d very much rather not to.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:27 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Mark_Friedenbach’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  Hmm that’s interesting, I need to find those people.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:26 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: ChristianKl’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  There are plenty of people who have AGI timelines that suggest to them that either AGI will kill them before they reach their natural mortality or AGI will be powerful enough to prevent their natural mortality by that point.

  True but there’s also plenty of people who think otherwise, other comments being an example.

  I’m not a biologist, but I’m reasonably sure that fascia getting tenser would be downstream of the hallmarks of aging, if that’s what you’re talking about. It’s kinda like asking why “going to a boardgame party in San Francisco” isn’t on the list of covid transmission vectors. And in any case, SENS is far from being the only organization, there’s many others with different approaches and focus areas, probably one of them covers fascia even if SENS doesn’t.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 3:11 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Matthew Barnett’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  I personally believe exactly the right kind of advocacy may be extremely effective, but that’s really a story for a post. Otherwise yeah, AGI is probably higher impact for those who can and want to work there. However, in my observation the majority of rationalists do not in fact work in AGI, and imao life extension and adjacent areas have a much wider range of opportunities and so could be a good fit for many of those people.

• SurvivalBias 16 Feb 2022 2:59 UTC

  1 point

  in reply to: Dagon’s comment on: Why ra­tio­nal­ists are not much con­cerned about mor­tal­ity?

  The way I see it, when we’re talking about non-me humans, the vast majority of them will be replaced with people I probably like roughly the same amount, so my preference for longevity in general is mild.

  Am I reading this incorrectly or are you saying that you don’t care about your friends and loved ones dying?

  There’s at least two currently ongoing clinical trials with an explicit goal of slowing aging in humans (TAME and PEARL), that’s just the most salient example. At some point I’ll definitely make a post with a detailed answer to the question of “what can I do”. As for the problem not being solvable in principle, I don’t believe I’ve ever seen an argument for this which didn’t involve a horrendous strawman or quasi-religion of some sort.